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Features of a Language of Thought
Cognitive scientists argue about whether there is a language of
thought, but its advocates haven't told us much about what it is
like. Stephen Pinker, an advocate, only tells us in
[Pin94]
The hypothetical ``language of thought'', or representation of
concepts and propositions in the brain in which ideas, including
the meanings of words and sentences, are represented.
A language of thought that might be used for robots or looked for in
humans is constrained by the characteristics of the baby's world and
the characteristics of the non-linguistic parts of the baby's
mind--including its limitations.
Here are some ideas about mentalese.
- grammar is secondary
- While most linguistic studies have
focussed on grammar, meaning is more important--in studying spoken
language, in proposing a language of thought and in designing
robots. A child's first speech consists of words which are attached
to things, or to appearances of things, or to sometimes ambiguous
combinations of things and appearances. ``Doggie'' is
stimulated by the sight of a dog, a picture, an animal on TV, the
sound of barking and conversation about dogs.
- maybe language starts with naming
- A human child starts language
learning with names for objects. This desire is independent of
having any goal concerning the object. We have the option of
designing an artificial child to know a lot of language, e.g.
English and/or a logical language from the beginning. Different
experimenters will explore different approaches.
- parallel information
- Images are presumably represented in
parallel. There is nowhere anything like a television signal
processor that handles a picture serially and repeatedly spreads it
out. This is obvious for pictures but surely applies to a lot of
other kinds of information. On the other hand, our inability to
think completely in parallel shows that many higher mental
functions are done serially.
- logic
- For a robot, a logical language 12 will be
most suitable, but some appropriate ascriptions of beliefs and
intentions to robots will refer to information represented
non-logically. Humans probably don't use quantificational
logic at the pre-verbal level, although we can use it when we have
to, and formal logic is often helpful when the information is
mathematical. Here's why I only say probably. Consider the
sentence ``For every boy there's a girl who loves only him.'' Its
predicate calculus representation,
,
has three embedded quantifiers. We then ask the question, ``What can
you say about the total number of boys and girls?'' A fair number of
people uneducated in logic find the correct answer that there must be
at least as many girls as boys. I haven't done the experiment
thoroughly, but the results suggest that the sentence with the three
levels of quantifiers is understandable by many logically uneducated
people and therefore its content is somehow internally represented.
Let's design it into our child.
- a word at a time
- Sentences uttered by humans are usually not
preformed in entirety before being uttered. A human starts a
sentence and thinks how to continue and finish it as he continues
talking. (The obvious argument is from introspection, but I suppose
experiments would confirm it.) Humans can preform sentences with
some effort. Vladimir Bukovsky tells about having composed a whole
book in prison while denied paper.
- chemical state
- Suppose a person is hungry--a condition humans
share with dogs. This can perfectly well be only be represented by
the chemical state of the blood stream. There is no reason to have
anything like the sentence, ``I am hungry'' anywhere in the brain
until the fact has to be communicated. Similarly we don't need
anything like a sentence in the memory of a computer to represent
the voltage of its battery.
- virtual sentences
- We may regard information that is directly
represented by the chemical state of the bloodstream or by a voltage
as expressed in virtual sentences along the lines of
[McC79] or [New82]. We may then sometimes be able to
explain some actions as involving logical inference involving the
virtual sentences.
- immediate reference
- Thinking about an object before one's eyes
does not require that it have a name. Something like a pointer to a
structure will do as well. We can see this, because when we have to
mention an object in speech we have to think of a name that will
enable the hearer to establish his own pointer to his mental
structure representing the object in question. Purely internal
symbolic names as in Fodor's proposed language of thought may
be useful even if they aren't communicable.
- short thoughts
- Thoughts are not like long sentences, although
a long sentence may be required to express a thought to another
person because of a need to translate internal pointers into
descriptions.
- communication
- When the fact of hunger or low battery voltage has to be
communicated something like a sentence is needed. Let's call it a
pseudo-sentence until we find out more. However, a pseudo-sentence
isn't needed to stimulate eating. It also isn't necessary to
represent the rule, ``if hungry, then eat''. In view of evolution,
one would expect the fact of being hungry to be represented both
chemically and in the language of thought.
- future
- There are other uses besides communication for
sentence-like forms. Very likely, the expectation of being hungry
by dinner time needs something different from a substance in the
blood for its representation.
- reasoning
- The language of thought is used for reasoning.
- not like spoken languages
- English and other spoken languages
won't do as languages of thought. Here are some reasons.
- Much mental information is represented in parallel and is
processed in parallel.
- Reference to states of the senses and the body has to be done
by something like pointers. Natural languages use descriptions,
because one person can't give another a pointer to his visual
cortex.13
- We don't think in terms of long sentences.
- Much human thought is contiguous with the thought of the
animals from which we evolved.
- For robots, logic is appropriate, but a robot internal
language may also include pointers.
- A language of thought must operate on a shorter time scale
than speech does. A batter needs to do at least some thinking
about a pitched ball, and a fielder often needs to do quite a bit
of thinking about where to throw the ball. Pointers to processes
while they are operating may be important elements of its
sentences.
I think there are additional reasons, but I haven't been able to
formulate them.
The language of thought may undergo major reorganizations. This may
be one reason why there is so little memory of early life. Almost
no-one can remember nursing or drinking from a baby bottle.
Next: Experimental Possibilities
Up: THE WELL-DESIGNED CHILD
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John McCarthy
2008-09-18